Finally, reification appears very clearly in Durkheim’s description of me-
chanical solidarity as opposed to an organic one.
Social molecules held together in this way alone could not move as a single whole unless they were lacking in specific movements of their own, like the molecules of inorganic bodies. This is why we propose to call this type of solidarity mechanical. This word does not signify that it has been produced by mechanical or artificial means. We call it thus only by analogy with the cohesion which holds together the elements of material bodies (corps bruts), in contrast with that which holds together living bodies. The use of the term is justified, finally, by the fact that the bond which unites the individual with society is completely analagous to that which unites things to the person. Individual consciousness, viewed in this light, is a simple dependency of the collective consciousness and follows all its movements, just as the thing owned follows all those movements impressed on it by its owner. In societies where this type of solidarity is highly developed, the individual does not belong to himself, as we will see later; he is literally a thing handled at the discretion of society. Thus, in these types of society, personal rights are not yet distinguished from property rights. (Durkheim, 1960, italics added)6
The meaning of this passage is clear. Societies with mechanical solidarity are reified societies; those with organic solidarity represent concrete dialectical totalities.
All quoted from: Durkheimianism and Political Alienation: Durkheim and Marx
Joseph Gabel Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Spring, 1984), pp. 179-189.